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Management communication problems In an organization
rarely lend themselves to a final and complete answer. Neither
is this thesis intended as a remedy for all the communication
needs of the Navy nor as an exhaustive study of all management
communication writings that might be applicable to the Naval
unit. It is intended, however, to provide an insight into
Navy management communication problems, a statement of those
problems, and the need for improvement. The applicability of
civilian business concepts to the peculiar requirements of a
Naval command will be investigated. Communication training
and improvement programs currently in use by industry will be
considered as a possible means of enhancing communication
effectiveness at the local command level.
For purposes of this thesis, the term "local command
level" will refer to the lowest level of command in the Navy.
It will, therefore, include all Individual units, exclusive of
staffs. It should be recognized that the size of a local command
may vary from a very few people to several thousand; that a
huge naval station in the continental United States and a small
seaplane tender in the Persian Gulf are both local commands;
and that the missions of various local commands may be as diverse
as their sizes and locations. This thesis is directed toward
the local command because it is there that the communication
1

2linkages must occur which will provide an opportunity for top
level leadership to take effect. It is at the local command
level where action becomes effective—the rest of the Navy
directs and supports, but it is at the local command level where
the Interaction occurs which results in force being brought to
bear towards an objective. It is to this level that all down-
ward organizational communication gravitates. Since it is the
lowest level of independent organizational action, it is also
the most nearly comparable to individually operating business
organizations and provides a useful area for direct comparison.
The management communication problems of the local
command, although not necessarily unique, are often of a
different nature than those which confront the Navy's top manage-
ment and intermediate staffs. The emphasis is upon internal
communication and more direct relationships between offices and
individuals at the lower level, whereas exterior communication
to superior and subordinate commands provides the area of primary
interest at higher levels.
References to higher levels in the hierarchy will be
made only to show how the local command communication problem
is affected by superiors. When considering the applicability
of management communication concepts to the individual command,
the point of view of the commanding officer will normally be
taken to facilitate discussion, although it is recognized that
many concepts might be applicable at the lower levels within
the command.
Mechanical and electronic devices that can increase

3communication effectiveness and render amazing services to
their fortunate masters are now available in a vast array of
colors and sizes. They are rarely to be found, however, at
the hierarchial level which is to be considered in this thesis.
Therefore, they will not be considered. They systems and proce-
dures field also offers many administrative advantages which may
be considered somewhat akin to management communication improve-
ment. This field will also be considered outside the province of
this thesis in order to concentrate on the communication area.
Consideration will be directed toward substantive, not mechanical,
improvement. The primary interest must be in what can be done
with present resources.
It should not be inferred from the title of this
thesis that the local command provides the most fertile field
for management communication improvement in the Navy. It may
be that considerably greater strides could be taken at much
higher levels in the hierarchy. This, of course, would be
worthy of the efforts of all who may be in a position to effect
that improvement. In the meantime, a study of communication
principles and concepts, derived from current writings and
U. S« industry practices may be beneficial to the local
commander. It will be shown that the active support of local
command "top manarement" is a basic requirement.

CHAPTER I
THE NAVY MANAGEMENT COMMUNICATION PROBLEM
The Duke of Wellington, writing to the Secretary
of State for War in 1810, said:
My Lord
:
If I attempted to answer the mass of futile
correspondence that surrounds me, I should be
debarred from all serious business of campaigning.
I must remind your Lordship for the last time,
that as long as I retain an independent position
I shall see that no officer under my command is
debarred by attending to the futile driveling of
mere quill-driving in your Lordship 's office from
attending to his first duty—which is, and always
has been, so to train the private men under his
command that they may, without question, beat any
force opposed to zham in the field,
I am, my Lord, your obedient servant,
Wellington
Whether or not Wellington's forthright stand i
his communication problem was a major factor in his subsequent
successes in the "serious business of campaigning," it illus-
trates that military paperwork problems are not entirely the
result of today's technological advances. Most of the
remarkable strides that have been taken in the arts and
sciences which have enabled the military man to arm himself
Quoted by Robert E. W. Harrison, in Comment and
Discussion, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings , Vol. 89, No. 11
(1963), P. 9^

with weapons of fearsome capability, however, have multiplied
the communications problem. The book of instructions for the
weapons available to Wellington, for instance, would bear
little resemblance to the voluminous tomes requires for a
modern weapons system.
That a serious communications problem exists in the
United States Navy is attested to by most experienced Naval
officers. As one officer sees it,
Prom the vantage point of more than a dozen
years at sea, four consecutive commands, and two
tours in the Pentagon, my opinion is that the
U. S. Navy is in the grip of a fight against a
force so strong, so insidious as to threaten seriously
the combat effectiveness of each seagoing unit. The
U. S. Navy today faces a message gap—a struggle to
communicate a sense of purpose and direction and
motivation which could be more decisive than any naval
action in world history.
Never before have we had so many reams of
instructions—and so little actual communication.
Never so many directives—and so little sense
of direction.
Never so much required leadership training
—
never so little effective leadership.
The situation is common to many large organizations,
since man has, in this century, developed a remarkable
capacity for constructing mammoth organizations without
the concomitant capability of managing them.
This crisis in administration is inevitably
accompanied by a rising tide of paperwork, a blind
fascination with administrative detail as an end
rather than a means, a compulsive dedication to the
word rather than the deed.
At no time in the history of our Navy has the
commander of a ship had more combat potential at
his command. Yet never before has the captain been
rendered so powerless by administrative detail to
command his own ship effectively.^-
Harvey 0. Webster, "The Message Gap," U. S. Naval
Institute Proceedings , Vol. 89, No. 5 (1963), p. 29.

6Many of the communications problems experienced in
a military organization are similar to those of any large
organization. In recent years, leaders of industry have
become increasingly aware of the need for effective communica-
tion. As a result, communications experts have come to the
fore and management has evidenced a new interest in communica-
tion improvement.
Even with the added emphasis, however, there often
seems to be less actual communication. An obvious factor
in both the business and military sectors is the sheer size
of the organization. Increasing the size certainly compounds
the problems of an organization in conveying information to
every level.
The wide variance in educational backgrounds and
interests accounts for another stumbling block on the communica-
tions path. In industry, the difference in vocabulary between
individuals on the same hierarchial level is often a serious
problem. Employees in the data processing department find it
increasingly difficult to discuss their jobs with their counter-
parts in the production department. A similar problem exists
in the military between the electronics specialist and the
ordnanceman.
The availability of capable personnel to process the
continually growing mountain of paperwork seems never to be
quite in proportion. Consider the comments of an officer in a
Navy patrol squadron, referring to the problems of the

administrative department.
Many new requirements have been laid on this
department in the last ten years. While personnel
administration has become more and more centralized
in Washington and other distribution centers, with
great batteries of accounting machines, offices in
the field gradually but steadily have had to increase
the volume of facts and figures that go to feed the
insatiable hunger of the machines. The re-enlistment
and career information programs have added many hours
of requirements to be met.
Processing NESEP, NAVCAD, STAR, SCORE, and other
programs is a time-consuming Job. Administration of
service-wide exams for advancement and pro-pay requires
an all-out effort several times a year, as does the
submission of evaluation sheets, which used to be no
more than "report cards", but now are fitness reports
that have to be submitted in the smooth on all petty
officers second class and above. Additional pages
and requirements for additional entries on pages in
service records have reduced the number of records that
one personnel man can maintain efficiently. The
administration of justice has become a complicated
technical procedure requiring a legal staff even at
the lowest levels. The number of findings disapproved
for technical legal reasons attests to the futility
of amateurs trying to be lawyers and judges. The
public information requirements for hometown news
releases and letters to parents and wives whenever
"Johnny" is advanced, or otherwise singled out, make
a staggering requirement for originating and typing
correspondence
.
Directives are continually being received requiring
additional collateral duties or special project assign-
ments for one officer or another, and better than 50
percent of these duties fall within the purview of the
administrative department. Controlling and tickling
the reports required to satisfy IBM appetites and
staff personnel is a mountainous Job. Required leader-
ship and career-training lectures and movies take away
additional on-the-job time and do not pay for themselves
when the people involved realize that they have to work
overtime to make up for training time spent off the Job.
What has been done to modernize, streamline, beef
up, or otherwise compensate for these increased require-
ments? At present, the patrol squadron allowance calls
for an administrative officer and his assistant, a
personnel officer and his assistant, an inform tion
and education officer, a first lieutenant, three YNs,
two FNs, anu several SN/SA. What did we have ten

8years ago? To the best of my recollection, exactly
the same allowance! The workload that has been
imposed on these people is neither sensible nor
fair. In aviation parlance, we are on the backside
of the power curve in the region of reverse command.
The more work imposed, the less attractive are clerical
billets. Consequently, it is harder to obtain strikers
in these ratings, and more work has to be done by the
personnel already committed to YN or PM careers.!
Virtually every officer and man in the Navy has
presented, at one time or another, at least one suggestion
for what he deems tc be a real improvement for the management
communication problem. 2 Most of these suggestions are verbal,
couched in other than learned terms, and not suscer.tible to
use in this thesis. They generally have one common character-
istic, regardless of their source; the area to be revised,
improved, or deleted is somewhere upward in the chain of command.
It does seem that many of the problems described thus
far can be attributed primarily to top management in the Navy.
This may be true. It certainly seems that the paperwork
requirements continue to be generated at a rapid clip and that
the various programs which require so much of the administrator's
time and effort are escalating. The net result, of course, is
less time available for the basic requirements of management
communication.
The tremendous increase in administrative communication
Robert A. Stephan, "The Forgotten Administrative




Interview with Mr, Robert Meehan, Hertd of Office Methods
Division, Navy Management Office, Washington, D. C. , January 29,
1964.

9in the Department of the Navy in the past few years has been
recognized by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, The redtape
procedure? and txe#08lve paperwork production have been
ascribed to virtually all levels of the Navy and the corrective
effort of all hands has been directed.
It seems unlikely, however, that any great, sweeping
revision can be expected which will obviate the requirements
for the flow of information in all directions in the military
establishment. The huge appetites of the Bureau of Naval
Personnel computers seem destined to gulp more and more personnel
information. Weapons systems will continue to require tremendous
quantities of the written work for their operation and mainten-
ance instructions. The flow of direction and control information
is basic to the large organization.
The Navy's management communication problems are real
and not capable of solution at any one level. Regardless of
whatever action is underway or contemplated at other levels,
however, a clearcut requirement exists at the bottom rung of
the ladder to ensure that the most effective methods are known
and used. The concurrence of senior commands is an obvious
need, but the active effort of the local command is the basic
ingredient.
U. S. Department of the Navy, OP" AY >Tctice 5216 .
Subject: Reduction of Administrative Correspondence in the
Operating Forcen (Pepte^ber 11, 106?), p. 1.

CHAPTER II
THE BASICS 0^ COMMUNICATION
Definition
Communication 5 s the act of conveying information
fron one individual to another.
Ey its definition, success Is implied, since there is
no communication If the transfer of information is not effected.
By a literal application of this definition, surprisingly little
of what Is normally considered to be communication actually fits
the description. A recent survey indicated that individuals
on the vice-presidential level in large organizations understand
only about two- thirds of* what they hear from top management.
Hen on the production line get only about twenty per cent of
It, according to the same survey.
The came kind of problems exist with written
communications, according to the Navy Management Office.
Don't sell this business of communication short.
The presence of station manuals, station orders,
departmental Instructions, up-to-date organization
charts, and a book of functional statements doesn't
guarantee, per se, that understanding has been
conveyed, has been accented. Understanding and
acceptance are rprt and narcel of communication.
Robert Proman, "Understand YJhat You Hear,"




A 7)iece of oa^er ^ay not communicate. See that
everyone not only has the word, bttt can and does
translate It into understanding, perspective,
vision, and enthusiasm.
Understanding, more than any other thinpr,
nourishes trust and respect, and an earnest desire
to contribute. Understanding liberates creative
thought—and management improvement ensues.
1
Management, or administrative, communication is a form
of communication with a particular purpose. It may be defined
as any communication intended to facilitate the management of
an organized group. 2 Communication tends to bind an organiza-
tion together. It is o**ten difficult to separate the study of
communication processes from an analysis of organization
structure. Regardless of what other activities or skills are
involved, the ability to communicate is inherent in any
supervisory position. Management and supervision cannot occur
without communication.-*
^unctions
Most management communication occurs as a result of
an individual's desire to inform or to influence another's
behavior. It is Important that this simple precept be
'
"The Manager and Pis Staff," Printed Document of the
Navy Management Office, Department of the Navy, Washington,
D. C. , p. 7.
2
Lee Thayer, ijministr-ative Communi cation (Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1961), p. 7.
3
Herbert A. Simon, dmlnlstrative Behavioi (New York:
Macmillsn Co., 1957), p. 15T!
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thoroughly considered. The quality of a letter Bust be
determiaeu on the oasis Of whether or net it peri crms the
function for which it wn? Intended^ An executive Id prepare
and deliver a speech to accomplish a function, not to be making
a speech. The ability to differentiate between the desired
end and the means to accomplish that end is a basic attribute
of a communicator.
l^ost authorities list a number of functions that can
be served by management communications. Although this may
provlc-r | us3ful meant for classifying further discussions on
the subject, it ir. deemed more appropriate and meaningful simply
to make the observation that each communication must perform a
function or be labeled ineffective.
Media and Forms
^or practical purposes, there are but two media for
management communications—visual and aural. All written
communication, drawings, signs, photographs, and any oth-
communication received through the sense of sight are included
in the former. All oral communication and any other eemmunlea-
tion received by way of the sense of hearing are included in
the latter. The relative efficiency of the two basic media
is an important consideration, even though scientific data





complete to answer all the questions about them. It is known,
of course, that reactions differ according to education,
background, general interest, and experience.
Most communications are in the two basic forms—oral
and written. The oral form generally offers the advantage of
accompanying gestures, tones of voice, and facial expressions
to enhance the effects of the spoken words. It is particularly
adaptable to situations which are dynamic and may require
changes momentarily. If the situation provides for face to
face confrontation and interaction, an additional advantage
accrues in that the communicator is provided an opportunity
to observe immediately whether or not his information has, in
fact, been communicated. This feedback also provides the
communicator with an indication of the recipients attitude as
a result of the communication. In other words, he is in a
position to determine if the information was received and,
if so, what reaction it triggered. The recipient is often
able to request clarification immediately, if any lack of
understanding exists.
Written communication may often be more authoritative,
because it seems more formal and concrete. It is also neces-
sary when the subject is complicated and a particular need
exists to avoid distortion. Written communication also provides
a record of the transaction, which is often desirable, but may
Charles E. Redfield, Communication in Management
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 63.
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have drawbacks In some instances. In the business world,
information concerning certain practices may be of a confidential
nature. Setting forth such information In written form,
therefore, necessitates Its careful protection against
unauthorized disclosure. Similar problems exist in military
organizations with classified material. In addition, although
reducing standard operating procedures and company policy to
writing is often desirable, it may result in resistance to
change and a lack of flexibility. Subordinates are also more
likely to lean heavily on written Instructions to cover every
eventuality; a situation which can result in the stifling of
ingenuity and initiative.
The choice between written and oral means of communica-
tion must be made only after considering the aspects of a
particular situation. It generally requires less effort and
less time to communicate orally. This method is particularly
adaptable to Instruction of workers In a dynamic situation,
particularly where their educational level may preclude their
ready understanding of detailed written instructions. The
situation may require a combination of the two means. It is
often desirable to initiate action quickly by means of an oral
instruction, with a written directive as back up and a provision
for a lasting record of the event.
More will be said of the relative merits of written
and oral communication in connection with specific situations.
It should be noted at this juncture, however, that the paper
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colossus in the Department of the Navy may well be the result
of too much reliance on written communication. An urgent need
to reduce paperwork is indicated.
Receiver Skills—Listening and Reading
In the search for improved communication methods, the
emphasis is mostly on the side of the communicator—the
individual who constructs the messages. The role of the
communicatee is indispensable to the process, however, as
indicated by Henry H. Albers:
The best message is of little avail unless the
person at the receiving end listens or reads and makes
an effort to understand. We often speak without
listeners and speak when we ought to be listening.
And we frequently fail to find readers for the
avalanche of words that make up the memoranda, letters,
and reports of the organizational world. A partial
solution is to speak less and say more and to write
shorter, fewer, and better messages. But a great deal
more attention should also be given to the development
of listening and reading skills. 2
In order to provide some background in the basics of communica-
tion as a stepping stone to improvement at the local command
level, then, some consideration of listening and reading skills
seems appropriate.
Ralph G. Nichols, in listing several guides to good
1U. S. Department of the Navy, OPNAV Notice 5216 .
Subject: Reduction of Administrative Correspondence in the
Operating Forces (September 11, 1963), P* !•
2
Henry H. Albers, Organized Executive Action: decision
Making, Communication, anri"""Leadership (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1961), p. 373.
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listening, suggests that listening: is not the passive function
many believe, but 4 r^ really hard work. It is characterized
by a quicker circulation of the blood and a snail rise in
bodily temperature. An effective listener must make an active
effort, must look for ideas and resist distractions. Nichols
also indicates that the average person has the ability to think
at about four times the normal speaking; rate of 125 words
per minute. By failing to make profitable use of that extra
thinking speed, many people find themselves considering
subjects other than the speaker* s and missing part of what Is
being said. Anticipating the speaker's comments and mentally
weighing his evidence are suggested as means of staying with
him and converting the speed differential to a listening
asset.
Prejudices and foregone conclusions can create an
atmosphere which makes listening difficult. The very mention
of certain words tends to conjure up thoughts and emotional
reactions that can blot out anything else the speaker has to
2
say. Mention of Income taxes at a time when the filing
deadline is approaching will cause many listeners to become
ex- listeners If they fail to make a conscious effort to overcome
this distraction. Zcr.c individuals require a conscious effort
to avoid bias in their feelings for the speaker and the
'•Ralph G. Nichols, "Listening is a 10-part Skill,"
Nation's Business (July 1957), P. 16.
^Albers, op. cit ., p. 37*1.
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result ant inability to really listen to What he has to say.
pe0 oTn^. Bing +- v">t listening is a ' 111 which can be
learned, many companies ^ave orovided courses to improve
employees* abilities in this vital area. Fven a basic dis-
cussion of efficient listening was found to provide an awareness
which resulted in considerably improved marks on listening
tests. Listening training need not be extensive to be
effective—an occasional lecture whicb points un the advantages
can improve communication at virtually every level.
Reading is a skill similar to listening; in many
respects and also requires considerable concentration and
effort to be effective. Although many people become skilled
readers on their own, reading improvement courses have been
extremely successful in many instances. A reading course
given to motion picture executives, for instance, increased
reading speed from an average of 250 to 300 words per minute
p
to about 800 words per minute. Fvldence indicates that an
increase in reading speed may also result In increased
comprehension.
Many companies have seen the need for T»eadin rr
improvement prorrams , as well as for listening training.
Training 1r> both skill* v;rm1r< spcn applicable to *» Naval
Nichols, QP» eit , , p. lii.
p
ill la Bant on Smith , Head ^asier—-and Pet ilore From





unit. In view of the excessive paperwork problem at all
levels in the Navy, it wouin *eem parti*ularly appropriate
that those who must deal with this colossus have the advantage
of the increased readin? aoeed that a reading improvement
progran could provide. An increase in reading rate similar
to that experienced by the motion picture executives referred
to above could provide a significant contribution to manage-
ment communication improvement at the local command level.
Informal Communication
Informal communication may be considered to be any
communication that is not nrovided for in the formal communica-
tion system in the organization. At one time, it was thought
of as an evil which should be discouraged at all costs,
because it tended to spread rumor and destroy reoutation.
Although the grapevine, as informal communication is commonly
called, does have some undesirable aspects, it may also be
beneficial. It is generally conceded that it cannot be
completely eliminated or controlled, but that it can be
influenced if it is understood.
To summarize the characteristics of the grapevine as
one authority on the subject sees them:
1
Grapevine," arvard. Business Review
.








1. It cannot be eliminated or suppressed.
2. It is faster than formal conrmni cation.
3. It is influential.
k. It is often incorrect.
5. It cannot be held responsible for mistakes.
6. It can occasionally be useful when formal
communication is inappropriate.
7. It is net shown on the organization chart.
8. It does not normally follow the chain of
command.
The grapevine is generally built about the social
and personal relationships of people in an organization.
The chain of command, therefore, has little effect on it, but
car pools, bowling teams, and informal lunch groups may be
quite significant. Leaders of these informal groups are
likely to become rather influential, sometimes without realiz-
ing the full capability of this influence. Since personal
relationships provide the core of the grapevine, it is to be
expected that the aims will be personal also and not
necessarily the same as the goals of the organization.
Keith Davis 1 study of the informal communication
process led him to conclude that certain people in an
organization may become "liaison individuals" for grapevine
information. It was noted particularly that the management
Don H. Scott, "Letting the Grapevine Take Over,"
Sales Management , Vol. 84 (March 18, I960), pp. 5^-55.
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group developed certain persons who would pass along information
to other selected individuals. These "liaison individuals" were
not always the same people; the type of information being the
determining factor. He also determined that the grapevine was
likely to pass along only current information. Generally, the
grapevine was selective and discriminating, although it could
not always be relied upon to be so.
The studies conducted by Davis also indicated that
informal communication tended to supplement formal communication,
but did not replace it. They showed a tendency for informal
communication to take effect downward or horizontally st higher
levels in most instances. Informal communication upward, if it
existed at all, was slow and via the chain of command. Davis
accounts for this by saying that higher levaIs in the management
hierarchy recognized the need for communication more readily
2
and had more time for it.
Don H. Scott suggests the development of regular and
dependable formal communication systems to minimize the unwanted




2. Develop a willingness to communicate.
3. Establish a reputation for sincerity
and truth.







4. Keep employees informed of any managerial
ftCtioo that will affect them.
5. r-et the grapevine on the side of management
.
6. Establish communication procedure,
^eduction o^ employee anxiety result r. in
less neetf ^or the grapevine.
Informal communication is not predictable in every
instance, but it is a definite force to be reckoned with in
every organization, h study vi 11 reveal which subordinates
are participator in the grapevine and what their areas of
interest p>ve. An example of hov.T the grapevine may be made
to work for the organization is provided by an occurrence
aboard a United States Navy ship during the Cuban missile
eriali in 1962. The ship had been at sea for several weeks
and the most trying period o** the crisis had long since past.
The crew was becoming anxious for some word of when they
would be returning to port, for it now seemed certain that the
major conflict had been averted. Hot even the command! n<"
officer, however, knew exactly when the ship would be ordered
back. A telephone call to the quartermaster to check on the
time of tides at the home port on a particular day in the
future, however, was sufficient to initiate the flow of
p-rapevine information and, in 3hort err , the word had
1
SOQtt, loc. Clt
. » p. 56,
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permeated every corner of the ship, fortunately, the ship
returned to port before the predicted date. The particular
method useri in tMs case may be questioned, but little argument
can be had with lta effectiveness or the efficiency of the
grapevine.
1
Interview with Lieutenant Commander Wilbert Knutson,





The process of communication provides the neans by
which leadership takes effect. An organization, regardless
Of how well designed and staffed it may be, relies on the
communication of orders and directives downward through the
various levels. Information about the work to be done is one
of the most important things a manager communicates about.
There are many different ways of conveying that information,
however, and a thorough appraisal of the situation is innortant
to selecting the most effective method.
Chester T, Barnard emphasized that an individual
will accept a communication as authoritative only when four
conditions exist:
1. He can and d^es understand the communication.
2. At the tine of his decision he believes that
It :3 no'; Inconsistent with th? purpose of
the organ! ?. at 1 or
.
1
Keith Davis, Human Relations in business (Mew




3. At the time of his decision, he believes it
to be compatible with his personal interest
as a whole.
4. He is able mentally and physically to comply
with it. 1
These conditions appear to be applicable to the
local command level of the Navy, as well as to the business
world. Careful consideration and thought applied to the full
implications of these conditions might do much to improve
management communications. As a matter of fact, adherence
to the principles suggested provide a complete basis for order
giving. The futility of communicating an order to an individual
who does not have the capability to understand it seems
apparent. In a military organization, where unquestioning
obedience to the order of a superior is required, each individual
must believe that the order is not inconsistent with the purpose
of the organization. Even the third condition set forth by
Barnard is applicable to the military. Although it may not
be readily recognized, the Marine who has accepted an order to
storm an enemy emplacement which is so well protected as to
invite certain death to an intruder has determined that he is
acting in accordance with his personal interest. The nature of
that personal interest undoubtedly varies with the individual.
Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 193H), p. 165.
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Some may accept such an order solely out of patriotism. Some
may do it "for the Corps"— and some may simply be motivated by
the threat of negative sanctions. Whatever the reason, it is
compatible with the individual's personal interest to accept
the order.
The fourth condition suggested by Barnard may be
so obvious that it is frequently neglected. If an individual
does not have the capability of complying with an order
effectively, he is indeed likely to reject it. Unrealistic
requirements, such as "continuous supervision" of some project
by a petty officer, or the imposition of a training program
which cannot be completed due to other work requirements,
will not be accepted.
The most famous demonstration of the futility of
trying to obey all orders was given by the skipper
during World War II who complied with the regulation
to unclip all ammunition daily—and proved that all
hands could not do it in the 2k hours.
1
Barnard's acceptance theory states that:
If a directive communication is accepted by one
to whom it is addressed, its authority for him is
confirmed or established. It is admitted as the
basis of action. Disobedience of such a communication
is a denial of its authority for him. Therefore, under
this definition the decision as to whether an order
has authority or not lies with the persons to whom
it is addressed, and does not reside in "persons of
authority" or those who issue these orders.
2
Herbert Pox Rommel, in Comment and Discussion,








In giving an order, then, it will be effective only if accepted
by the person for whom intended, regardless of the rank or
position of the order giver. The Glenn L. Martin Company has
suggested the following general guides to help superiors gain
acceptance of the orders they issue:
A request doesn't offend the sensitive worker,
while a direct order often antagonizes.
The direct order—if not used too frequently—
stands out emphatically. It tends to shock a
worker out of his lethargy, and may save a
dismissal.
A request may partly melt the hard-boiled man,
and is worth trying before a direct order.
The implied order usually gets best results from
the dependable worker. But it is not for the
inexperienced or unreliable.
The first time an error is made, a request to
correct it adds the friendliness that keeps a
man on your side. The direct order may be advisable
on repetition of the error.
The direct order is appropriate for the chronic
violator—and if most of your oders have been
requests, the change to a direct order will carry
emphasis.
The call for volunteers often is a challenge and
produces good resulbs where the job is disagreeable,
calls for special effort or involves unpopular
overtime. But don't use it to escape responsibility
for making assignments in the best interests of
production.
To develop ability and judgment in a promising
employee, the implied or suggestive order is a
good way of trying him out and putting him on
his own. Close follow-up may be required, however.
Th* emergency usually requires a direct order. 1
Reproduced in: M. Joseph Dooher and Vivienne Marquis
(ed.), Effective Communication on the Job (New York: American
Management Association, 1956), p. 106.

27
As suggested, there are tines when the direct order
is required. This is probably the case more often in the
military than in a civilian organization and there certainly
should be no hesitancy in making use of it. The nature of
military duties requires unquestioning obedience to the direct
order—and with good reason. A request or implied order,
however, provides a subordinate with an opportunity to do more
than the minimum required. It would seem to be to the
superior's advantage to determine who is likely to accept such
an opportunity. An improvement in management communication
may be only one of several advantages that could accrue to such
a determination.
Certain functions which tend to be repetitive in
nature and which reflect the general tenor of an organization
may be carried out by subordinates with a minimum of communica-
tion if susceptible to description as a policy of the organiza-
tion. Once the particular evolution is defined and set forth
by management, further time-consuming instructions are
obviated. Policy directives provide a most efficient means
of directing the efforts of subordinates when properly
administered. The need for careful consideration of policy
matters is inherent; broader dissemination and a wider range
cf subordinate courses of action are generally implied.
Policy is simply management's attitude. It is
reasonable to assume that the chief executive
officer of a company has, from experience, arrived
at atoiludeb concerning how the oueraliuns under
his jurisdiction will be conducted. It is likewise
reasonable to assume that his attitudes must be
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communicated continually down the line of organization
if nnerat^ orirs ?>r? to Proceed ?. cc©$"£4n r to hie rlan.
Written policies are one meanc of transmitting
management's attitudes , 1
In modern management the use of manuals to communicate policies
2
and decisions is gaining favor. The manuals must be readable
and readily accessible to the user, if they are to accomplish
their purpose. In order to maintain the effectiveness of a
manual, specific provisions should be made to keep it up to date.
By their nature, manuals provide only for communication down;
some method must therefore be incorporated to enable users to
communicate up the line when operating experiences indicate a
need for change or reconsideration of policy. This feedback
can be included in the manual revision system. Pegular audits
should be scheduled to review the manual and coordinate its
revision or reissue.
The application of policy directives to the local
command level in the Navy may provide an opportunity for more
efficient use of personnel, in management communication. Close
scrutiny of the wording of policy matters and attention to
the details of current policy application might provide an
area of management communication enhancement worthy of the
local commander^ full attention.
'•James G. Hendrick, "Company Manuals," Systems and
Procedures, ed. Victor Lazzaro (Hnglewcod Cliffs , N. -T . :







Information which flows from the top is often thought
of as being solely in the form of orders which are esser.ti.il
to the operation o^ the organization. Part of the communi cation
directed downward, however, may be only Indirectly related to
operations and some may bear no discernible relationship at
all. Letters to Individual employees concerning the company's
credo and listing the community service efforts of the previous
year, for example, may bear little relationship to order giving.
Handbooks for new employees are not really a necessary adjunct
to the direction of their efforts on the Job,
Keeping the employee Informed is deemed an essential
part of good relations. Studies by the United States Chamber
of Commerce, The American Management Association, and The
Association of National Advertisers have indicated that an
employee needs to know the aims of the organisation in order
to become more closely Identified with it. This was found
to be true for workers in the factory or in the office; at
2
all levels of the organization.
Several methods were found to be effective for use
as machinery for communicating down. In addition to new
employee handbooks and individual letters to employees, trips
Redfield, op. ait ., p. 47.
2
Stuart Chase, "Communication Up, Down, and Sideways,"
Headers' Digest (September 1952), p. 56.
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around the plant and open house visits were found to serve the
purpose admirably.
It would seem that the need to keep subordinates
conversant with the mission and tasks assigned would be as
important in a Naval organization as in any other. It may be
that this is recognized in the Naval organization, but is
applied only to the immediate task at hand. Instead of
focusing on the objectives of the whole Naval Establishment
in the weeks, months, and years ahe?d, the emphasis may be
on what the ship expects to accomplish in the next gunnery
exercise. A man needs to know his immediate objective, of
course, but he also needs much more. The studies of civilian
industry indicate that most employees are capable of looking
2
at the goal of the whole organization. When the methods of
downward communication are utilized, then, care must be taken
to assure that the goals assigned are appropriate. The motiva-
tion of subordinates seems a most appropriate goal. As
recognized by Emile Durkheim, writing at a much earlier date,
And truly, if he does not know whither the operations
he performs are tending, if he relates them to no
end, he can only continue to work through routine.
Every day he repeats the same movements with monotonous
regularity, but without being interested in them.
He is no longer a living cell of a living organism
which unceasingly vibrates with neighboring cells,
which acts upon them, and to whose actions is no








an external force set going which always moves
in the same direction and in the same way. 1
The effect on employee attitude must always be
considered when passing information down the line. Adherence
to the following principles may be of benefit in this regard:
1. Try to provide advance information, when
possible.
2. Tell only the truth.
3. Explain why.
4. Pass out the bad information with the good.
5. Encourage subordinates to speak up and
pto make comments or ask questions.
The advantage of adhering as closely as possible to these
principles is primarily lodged in the fact that respect for
management will accrue only when managers have developed the
reputation for worthwhile, timely, and reliable information.
1
Emile Durkheim, "Division of Labor and Independence,"
Human Relations in Administration , ed. Robert Durbin (2nd
ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961), pp. H2-1J3
2
"When to Speak Up," Nation's Business , Vol. 51,





There are many values, however, that accrue to
those managers who listen willingly, who urge their
subordinates to talk freely and honestly. Upward
communication reveals to them the degree to which
ideas passed down are accepted. In addition, it
stimulates employees to participate in the operation
of their department or unit and, therefore, encourages
them to defend the decisions and support the policies
cooperatively developed with management. The opportunity
for upward communication also encourages employees to
contribute valuable ideas for improving departmental
or company efficiency. Finally, it is through upward
communication that executives and supervisors learn
to avert the many explosive situations which arise
dally in industry. 1
Although oriented toward civilian industry, the
thoughts expressed above would seem to have equal application
to the military manager. Upward communication can provide the
feedback needed to determine not only whether information was
received and understood, but also whether it was accepted.
The manager can thereby determine the extent to which his
authority has been established, as well as the effectiveness
of downward communication. If it can be determined that orders
Earl G. Planty and William Machaver, "Stimulating
Upward Communication," Effective Communication of the Job
,
ed. M. Joseph Dooher and Vivienne Marquis (New York:




and instructions from the superior are readily understood, a
reduction in management communication downward may be effected—
a result devoutly to be desired at the Navy's local command
level.
Subordinates who can communicate their feelings and
ideas to management may find less need to criticize superiors.
If the employee feels that his suggestions and complaints have
reached a higher level, and have received consideration at that
level, he may be less inclined to complain to others at his
own level. Although military organizations are not generally
noted for their democratic precepts, all subordinates retain
some belief in their own inherent worth and the worth of their
ideas. The opportunity to express ideas provides an opportunity
to retain personal dignity and to Identify to some degree with
the management of the organization.
Methods
The solution to the question of how best to promote
communication upward may seem quite easily arrived at by
superiors in military organizations. The ease with which a
report can be required of subordinates is legendary. The need
for reports is recognized, but an over-emphasis or the require-
ment for an excessive number of reports can be unfortunate.
There is danger that at some point reports
may become M important* or even more important,
than the Job itself. Sometimes this results from
an overemphasis being placed on the reports by
those who prescribe them and, therefore, by
those who prepare them. In other cases, the
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reports become no enmeshed with operations that
neither can be revised without upsetting the other.
An example of how the report can become the paramount
consideration is provided by the story of one foreman who
gave instructions in great detail to the operators of a
certain piece of machinery. Having operated the machinery
for some time, the operators knew that it could provide the
required output only if their own method were utilized—not
the one specified by the foreman. In reporting the details
of the machinery operation, the operators were careful to put
down readings that the foreman expected; not the actual ones.
By so doing, they met the requirements for production and for
reporting, but the reports produced were solely for the
ppurpose of keeping the foreman happy.
At the local command level, consideration might be
given to reducing required reports by some application of
the management by exception principle. Unfortunately,
encouraging the reporting of only those events which require
action by management may reduce the upward flow of communication
to a point where Information requirements are not met. Sub-
ordinates may interpret an attempt to reduce the extraneous




"Burleigh B. Gardner and William F. Whyte, "The Nan
in the Middle! Position and Problems of the Foreman,"
Applied Anthropology , Vol. 4 (19*15), p. *3«
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at the lower levels. The unit commander may well ^ind this
to be an area where written reports can be curtailed, while
encouraging verbal communication flow.
Interviewing often provides an effective means of
encouraging upward communication.
Interviewing produces facts plus a wealth of
other information that would not flow upward
routinely—attitudes and opinions, suggestions
and complaints, rumors, beliefs, feelings, needs,
hopes, frustrations, and motivations. 1
This is a tool extensively used in Navy organizations. It
would seem particularly useful when conducted as a subordinate
is leaving the command, whether he is being transferred to
another command or separated from the Service. During such
an exit interview, the interviewee might be expected to
provide information with a great deal of candor, since he can
assume that he is less subject to sanctions of immediate
superiors and peers.
The interviewing technique may spell the difference
between the eliciting of valuable information and a wasted
session. Since the interview is an expensive communication
technique in terms of management time expended, care should
be taken to ensure its effectiveness. The interviewer*
s
attitude and his ability to listen will encourage the subordinate
and help to put him at ease. The physical setting for the
interview will also contribute to this end. The interviewer
1Redfield, op. cit .» p. 159
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should normally rrfuse ^ost of the opportunities provided him
to comment on what he has heard | making only a non-committal
remark or rephrasing a statement* t^ note* are required, they
should be only the minimum, sc as not to inhibit the inter-
viewee.
Ideally, a communication should follow the chain
of command, step by step, upward through the organization
until it reaches the level where appropriate action can be
2
taken to handle the problem effectively. At many Navy commands,
a certain time is set aside by the executive officer to hear
requests from members of the crew.-' These request masts provide
an opportunity for an individual to air any problems he may
have that have not been solved at a lower level. This practice
is excellent in that it provides the aggrieved one with an
onportunity to carry his complaint to someone higher than his
immediate superior. The necessity for submitting a formal
request may deter some, however. In addition, the knowledge
that the immediate superior may find it objectionable that the
individual concerned has taken his problem over the head of




Planty an- Maehaver, loc. cit ., p. 144.
3JJohn P. Noel, Jr. and William J. Hiller, The
Bluejackets' Manual (17th ed.; Annapolis, Md. : U. S.
Naval Institute, 1963), p. 59.
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Local con-rand "top Basi&gtatnt should consider the desirability
cf minimizing these deterrents if this channel of upward
communication is tc be effective.
According to Kfcith Davis, the informal communication
chain will provide little assistance in upward edvmunl cation.
Kis studies indicate that the flow of information upward via
the grapevine was minimal and slow. This would seem to
indicate the need for stimulating and encouraging the flow of
information through formal channels. Whatever methods are
utilized for upward communication, care must be taken to ensure
that a cross-section of information is obtained. To get a
true picture of conditions, some planning is required to
preclude the possibility that some aggressive individuals may
cause the entire situation to be slanted toward their views.
Barriers
Even though management may appreciate the need
for effective upward communication, it may not
translate this need into action. It becomes apparent
at once that to swim up the stream of communication
is a much harder task than to flow downstream. The
currents of resistance, inherent in the temperament
and habits of supervisors, and employees and in the
complexity and structure of modern industry, are
persistent and strong.
2
Dftvls, "Manae-e^ent Communication and the Hranevine,"
r>. 48.
2
Planty ana Machaver, loc. cit
. , p. 1^7.

38
A discussion of some of the impediments that tend to preclude
free flow of communication upward may assist in the removal
of these obstructions.
The subordinate often has little incentive to
communicate upward. This may generally be traced to the
fact that superiors failed to act constructively on previous
communications. An indication of lack of interest by
management discourages any future attempts to convey
information.
The subordinate usually lacks the facilities for
communicating upward. Management may use meetings, memoranda,
bulletin boards, et cetera, to communicate down the line and
is in a position to add to the list of facilities if the need
arises. Subordinates, however, must ordinarily make use of
whatever facilities are provided by management. The superior
may generally be expected to have a better command of the
language and will normally be able to translate his thoughts
into words and communicate them more effectively. In addition,
authority and prestige tend to reenforce communication down,
whereas these very things often become barriers to be overcome
in communicating upward.
If the information being communicated upward is in
the nature of some unsolved problem of the organization,
it may be construed as a criticism of management, with the
attendant tendency of the part of the manager to reject or
resist it. A very real barrier may therefore be placed in
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the way of communication.
The sheer size or complexity of the organization
may be sufficient to delay or reduce upward communication.
It may be anticipated that several management layers will
tend to minimize upward flow. As indicated by Opinion Research
Corporation of Princeton, New Jersey, following a study of
corporate communi cation problems in seventeen companies,
it may be that the flow of information Is obstructed on purpose,
Opinion Research, as quoted In the Washington Post , suggests
that the individual who blocks passage of the word might do
so for the following reasons:
He is second in command, or "gate keeper",
through which all communications must pass before
they reach the top man. But this system falls
down if the No. 2 man only t6lls his superior
what he thinks the boss wants to hear. In these
cases, the head man starts to operate with a
"distorted view of reality," Opinion Research
says.
He is one of two rivals competing for a
higher Job and keeps information to himself to
enhance his own reputation or detract from his
rivals standing.
He is a manager who appears unapproachable
to his employees through "temperament, ignorance
or inadvertance." Or he is available but always
talks instead of listening.
He is a department manager who covers up his
departmental inefficiency to make himself look
good and suggests deficiencies in areas outside
his domain. •*
Information need not be completely blocked to cause
"""Didn't Get the Word? Maybe it's Deliberate," The
Washington Post
.
August 25, 1963, p. 7.
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considerable difficulty. Both deliberate and nondeliberate
distortion can affect the upward flow of information as well.
The nature o** the superior-subordinate relationshiD frequently
fives rise to deliberate distortion.
Subordinates sometimes deliberately distort the
information they send up the line to protect
their interests and make their performance look
good to superiors. A confession of mistakes may
be Tood for the soul, but it does not rrenerpi lly
lead to promotion and pay increases. Subordinates
^re inclined to take the sting out of failures by
withholding and slanting information and to unduly
-hasize any measure of success that may come their
way. Another problem in upward communication is the
tendency to cater to the likes and dislikes of the
superior. Make the boss feel good even if it means
stretching the truth a little or a great deal.
Don't disturb his personal equilibrium with news
he doesn't like to hear. The logic seems to be
that a happy boss /^ives rewards and an unhappy boss
exacts penalties.'
Providing the subordinate with a chance to express
his sentiments and attempting to promote a feeling of loyalty
to the superior may help to reduce deliberate Information
distortion. Confidence in the aims of management and the
development of trust in the organization would further this
program.
Nondeliberate distortion may result from the semantic
problem or from processing, handling or transporting problems.
As information flows from the bottom to the top of the
hierarchy, it may be expected that more and more details
will be left out. This process of abstraction is subject to
"Albers, op. cit
. t p. 3b0

the various judgments of the people who pass the information
along—every level views it from a slightly different viewpoint.
Albers suggests a possible solution to this problem.
Some distortion in the upward and downward
flow of information can be eliminated by the use
of information facilities that have some degree
of independence from the chain of command. Thus,
information obtained through an employee counseling
program can be used to check information received
through regular channels. A suggestion system may
provide important additional information about the
situation at lower levels. Staff assistants can
be used to obtain information from various parts of
the organization, but, of course, they should be
careful not to give the impression that they are
spying. Periodic personal visits with lower echelon
executives and employees offer another approach.
However, such techniques involve a short-circuiting
of the chain of command and can have adverse conse-
quences if improperly done or carried to the extreme.
*
This suggestion would seem particularly applicable
to a Navy command. A short, informal conversation with a
man on the hangar deck or in the engine room not only provides
direct access to the tenor of feeling at that level, but is
an indication that the "old man" is interested in the welfare
of the crew.
Py far the most effective method of tapping
the ideas of subordinates is sympathetic listening
in the many day-t D»MSay , inf©nna3 contacts within
the departments and outside the workplace. There
are no full-blov.-n syptens that will do the * oh
in any easier manner. No delegation of a manager's
responsibility to know the thoughts and attitude?
of his subordinates is possible. This is a job
which must in the main he done individually,






It is not something to be accomplished by a high-
pressure drive or through a mechanical system.
Nothing can equal a manager* s willingness to hear.
Albers 1 warning of the dangers of bypassing the chain of
command should be thoroughly considered, however. To create an
aura of distrust in the intermediate levels could cause a
complete breach in the flow of information upward through
normal channels.
Summary
A requirement exists for management to be able to
determine the extent to which ideas and Instructions are
received and accepted at the lower levels and to be in a position
to evaluate subordinate feelings and ideas. This feedback is
no less necessary In a military organization and can be
reliably and consistently obtained only by a conscious effort
on the part of management. A reduction in management communica-
tion requirements can often be effected by an efficient upward
information flow—the need for excessive and repetitive downward
communication having thereby been averted.
Although written reports provide the desired flow of
information, they contribute to paperwork excesses. Written
reports should therefore be minimized at the local command level.
Both deliberate and nondeliberate distortion of
information may be expected. Encouraging confidence in
1
Planty and Machaver, loc. cit
. , p. 1^7.
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superiors' aims and the use of facilities independent of






Great size and specialization cut down the
opportunities for cross-talk while they Increase
the need for it. If there is to be coordinated
effort, there must be methods for the horizontal
interchange of information. 1
Horizontal communication provides the opportunity
for individuals in one part of an organization to understand
the problems of those in other divisions or departments. It
can become the basis for empathy, which can, in turn, result
in cooperation and more effective direction of the efforts
of the parts toward the accomplishment of the aims of the
whole. The methods of horizontal communication are not
exclusively horizontal, are often by-products of vertical
communi c at i on
.
Although most local commands in the Navy are not
of the size and complexity of the giant industrial organizations
of the business world, the tendency to specialize in the
various departments and the diverse aims of the various
divisions make consideration of the possible benefits of






Edward C. Schleh defines a committee as: • •
any group of two or more people who get together to discuss
a problem." David C. Phillips seems to be discussing the
same kind of evolution when he says, "Whether it is called
conference, discussion, group dynamics, or an aspect of human
relations, the ability of people to sit down together and
pdiscuss a common problem is needed in industry today."
Since the terms "committee" and "conference" seem to be used
interchangeably in writings on the subject of horizontal
communications generally, they will not be differentiated
in this thesis.
A survey of executive attitudes on the subject
of committee organization might well lead to the
frustrating conclusion that committees must be the
worst and the best means to achieve a goal. One
side of the argument is illustrated by such comments
as: the best committee is a three-man committee
with two men absent; minutes are taken, but hours
are wasted. In spite of such criticism, committees
are found in many organizations and, when properly
used, are important instruments of managerial action.-^
1
Edward C. Schleh, Successful Executive Action
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1955), p. 7b.
2
David C. Phillips, Oral Communication in Business




uBy providing insights into the problems of others,
committees provide for a broader, more comprehensive point of
view. Since it is rare indeed for one department to be
exclusively concerned with all aspects of a given problem
area, committees can bring together the various departments
for resolution of problems and for decision-making. This
also provides for more reliable Judgment, since extreme views
tend to be moderated somewhat by the interaction.
Committees and conferences provide subordinate
managers with an opportunity to be heard and to contribute
in areas which might normally be closed to them. By having
had an opportunity to be heard and to participate in the
decision making process, they may be more inclined to accept
a decision, even though they may have opposed that particular
course of action during the committee discussion. An
excellent training ground for managers is one of the important
by-products of committees and conferences. Even where an
individual does not actively participate, he is provided an
opportunity to observe his seniors' activities in an environment
in which he may some day find himself.
Committees and conferences also provide an excellent
opportunity for vertical communication, both upward and
downward. They provide management with a chance to pass the
word to several people at the same time, while obtaining an
Indication of subordinate reaction at the same time.
A serious disadvantage of committee action is the
tendency to consume considerable time in accomplishing the
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stated purpose. When the tine utilised is applied to the
salaries of the members, it can be seen that considerable
expense may also be involved. The time and expense should
be minimized, of course, by close adherence to a pre-planned
agenda and the tight control of the chairmen. Committee!
end conferences are also sometimes criticized for their
inability to obtain decisive results. Dy their nature, it may
be anticipated that compromise will play an important part in
decision making, with resultant dilution of the result.
The American Management Association conducted a
study to determine the relative efficiency of committee and
individual aprrcaches to various problems dealing with twelve
management functions. 1 Durinp the study, executives were
interviewed and records examined in twenty organizations and
the results classified in four categories of effectiveness.
The results indicated that individual action was superior in
problems involving the functions of leadership, execution,
decision making", and organizing. Comtrittees, however, were
considered more effective in dealing with problems that involved
the interests of different departments within the organization.
Automatic Horizontal Communication
Joseph L. Massie has suggested the use of "automatic
Ernest Dale, Planning and Developing the Company
Organization Structure, research Peport No. 2 (New York;




horizontal communJ ratio*'" to make use of the better features
of committees and conferences with a resultant decrease in
management communication for higher executives. This approach
suggests that each executive be expected to check his
proposals with the plans of every other executive on the same
level in order to maintain coordination. The onus is thereby
placed upon the prpounder of a course of action to have cleared
it with others at his level, or at least have their ideas on
the subject, before continuing. In this way, many decisions
are made and the action carried out without any exertion of
initiative on the part of the higher executive.
This job of searching for consistent actions among
executives is often handled by committees. Automatic verbal
communications, however, would cause manv more matters to be
informally and routinely handled by direct contact amonp
specialists, generally two at a time, and later reported to
higher levels. According to Massie,
Organization theory necessarily assumes such direct
contact between two executives, but too often it
treats them informally and even haphazardly. A more
detailed analysis would enable management specialists
to understand the proper place and role of these
contacts and, possibly, to develop models which will
make them more dependable and efficient. 2
Joseph L. Fassie, "Automatic Horizontal Communication
in Management," Current Issues and Emerging Concepts in
Management , ed. Paul M. Dauten, Jr. (Eos ton: Houghton-






Here is an area that may have considerable practical
application at the local command level in the ."Javy. As
nrcrosed, Hassle* f idea of automatic horizontal communication
is really a form of management by exception with a built-in
plan for cross-referencinf problems among managers at the same
level. To make practical use of this idea in a Navy unit, the
following are suggested as basic requirements:
1. The commanding officer must wholeheartedly
support the plan. This will mean, if he in to expect automatic
horizontal communication between his department heads, that he
be willing to allow those department heads some discretion
and some authority to deal with problems at their levels. It
will also mean that the commanding officer will not be able
to keep informed of the minute details that are within the
nrovince of the department heads. In short, it meana that
tf the aOramanding officer is to accept thin nlan to reduce
vertical management communication problems, he must be willing
to get along with less detailed information end rely on his
immediate juniors for information on the things he really
need? to know.
2. The eovimandlng officer must orovide firm,
predetermined criteria for formirr Guidelines within which
department head must function. fti envisioned, the svstem
provides for automatic control in the sense that corrective
action is taken spontaneously. Predetermined criteria must
provide the basis for advislnr subordinates what limits of
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corrective action they are allowed and when they must notify
the superior of action taken or contemplated.
3. The commanding officer will need to check
occasionally to determine if horizontal communication is, in
fact, being effected and to make certain that the use of
authority is appropriate.
*J. The use of the system for automatic horizontal
communication must be recognized in the organization manual
and in the Job descriptions for the individuals affected. It
must be clearly shown that department heads are required to
communicate with other department heads on questions that
affect them. This communication to occur before action is
taken or before the problem is taken to the commanding officer,
This must be a formal, recognized channel of communication.
The reward for effecting a system for automatic
horizontal communication, as suggested by Massie, would seem
to include more efficient management communication; it might
also include the encouragement of the use of ingenuity and
resourcefulness by Junior officers.
Summary
Horizontal communication provides the basis for
more effective organizational action by promoting cooperation
and teamwork.
The U3e of committees and conferences is a well
recognized means of encouraging horizontal communication, but
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they tend to be uneconomical and often lack decisiveness.
Committees are most effective in dealing with inter-departmental
problems; are inferior to individual action for problems
involving decision making, leadership, execution, and
organizing.
The concept of automatic horizontal communication
would require that executives on the same level communicate
on problems of mutual interest and then take appropriate
action at their level. A decrease in total management
communication would result. This concept is suggested as
being particularly applicable to the local command level in
the Navy. It is suggested that additional advantages might
accrue in the form of additional time available to the
commanding, officer for important matters and the encouragement
of the use of resourcefulness by Junior officers.

CHAPTER VI
COMMUNICATION TRAINING IN INDUSTRY AND ITS APPLICATION
TO THE NAVY LOCAL COMMAND
Recognition of the Need for Improvement
The importance of communication In U. S. industry is
generally recognized and accepted by executives. It is also
realized that a problem exists in this quest for- more «nd
better information. The Research Institute of America conducted
a survey of ^3 company presidents which tended to bear out
these statements. In a list of ten major areas of concern,
those polled ranked as number on the problem of providing and
getting more Information.
After a study of the communication problem in
U. S. industry, Thomas F. Ball, Jr. said,
Some people consider the communication problem
one of the form of communication; others pay attention
only to the substance . Some believe that, since face-
to-face relations go on informally in every company
every day, understanding is by far the most important
aspect of the problem. There are those who feel that
a company's actions speak far louder than any written
or spoken word. Others try to isolate the problem
either at the top management, middle management,
supervisory, or worker level. Finally, there are
1
Auren Uris, "Hear and Be Heard—Effectively ,"
Nation's Business
,




some who consider the goals and objectives , or
lack thereof, of communication programs the real
problem area.
The one thing upon which all agree, however,
is that there is a communication problem in
industry today. 1
Although industry leaders seem agreed that a communica-
tion problem exists, not all of them believe that formal
training of managers and executives in communication would
be beneficial. Langley C. Keyes indicates that many managers
are well aware of the importance of production, marketing,
personnel, finance, and research, and support further education
in these fields readily. In management communication, which
"runs like a vital and indispensable stream" through all those
fields, these same managers are often less inclined to invest
time and money, however. 2 Many believe that those in oositions
of managerial responsibility must already have developed the
required communication skills and that to provide these people
with instruction in the basics of communication would be an
insult. Most top managers recognize a need for communication
training at the middle and upper levels of executive development
They are aware that most individuals at those levels have
Thomas P. Ball, Jr., "Communications Training in U. S.
Industry," (unpublished Master* s thesis, School of Government,
Business and International Affairs, The George Washington
University, 1963), p. 13.
2
Langley C. Keyes, "Profits in Prose," Harvard Business
Review, Vol. 39 (January-February, 1961), p. 1097"
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advanced through the organization by way of sorre specialized
skill, and this tendency to specialize at the beginning tends
to preclude their being able to communicate with other
specialists at the tine v/hen it is most important. Tn addition
to the increased need to communicate horizontally, a managerial
position often carries with it the requirement for more vertical
communication—more contact with top management and more need
to convey information to a larger group of better informed
subordinates.
It would seem that • similar situation may exist at
the local command level in the Havy. Although attempts may be
made to provide junior officers with experience in several
fields, they often tend to specialize in one department, such
as operations or engineering, during the first few years. Upon
attaining department head status, or higher, an increased
requirement is placed upon them to deal with other areas. It
also seems that a comparable situation exists in the officer
ranks where maturing officers are placed in positions requiring
more contact with the upper level and more need to be able to
communicate with all levels. It may be that a training program
similar to that in use by Industry would be appropriate for
the Navy's "ycung executives".
The Training Programs
Training programs for executive development have
Increased phenomenally In recent years. One nationwide survey
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indicated that ^0% or more of the major comoanles have some
sort of in-plant training for this purpose. * The nrograms vary
to some extent, of course, but most are Mmeri at artyanMnp; the
executives' abilities in the basic skills, including
communications. In order to provide an insight into communica-
tion training at the executive level in industry, one researcher
wrote to fifty-four companies to determine which had formal
communication training programs. To the thirteen who responded
in the affirmative, he sent a questionnaire to determine the
extent of their programs. Three of the companies were selrrted
as exemplifying successful solutions to the executive communica-
tion problem; Kimberly-Clark, Republic Steel, and the Aluminum
Company of America.
The Kimberly-Clark program is characterized by the
full support of top management and the balance of the programs
offered to meet the needs of the individual. ^ The first course
offered i« available to all levels of management and deals
with basic communication techniques. The second course,
conducted by the company Management Research and DevelODment
Staff, is aimed at the more exoerienced executive and deals
Robert C. Sampson, "Train Executives While They
Work," Harvard Business Review » Vol. 31, No. 6, p. ^2.
2
Frank E. Fischer, "A New Look at Management







with concepts, rather than techniques. Conference leadership
and inter-personal communications sre stressed. As a check
on the effectiveness of the programs, audits are made on those
who have participated in either course to determine if any
changed behavior pattern is evident.
Republic Steel* s program features an even more active
participation by top management and also offered both
technique and content courses. Most of the trainees in the
Republic program are thoroughly experienced executives, the
average age being forty-five years. No special selection is
required for enrollment in the courses and training is scheduled
for the attendees' off duty time. The quality of the training
is evaluated by observing the former students by immediate
supervisors and by top management.
Salient features of the Aluminum Company of America
program also include strong top management support, as well
as some variety in course content in order to meet the needs
p
of the individual. Performance appraisals are used to
determine the area of communication improvement most needed
by the individual. Three basic approaches are utilized in
the training; the problem-solving conference, training in
face-to-face communications with individuals, and the principles







average trainee has been selected for the braining, has been
with the company for fifteen years, and Is a college graduate.
Top management monitors the effectiveness of the program.
From a consideration of the main points of the programs
of the three companies which were selected as being repre-
sentative of industry's programs, some features appear to be
characteristic. First, the programs are organized to provide
instruction in broader theories, as well as the specific
requirements, of communication. Second, the results of the
training are closely monitored. That the programs have been
in effect for some time would seem to attest to their
effectiveness under this clcse control. Third, the firm and
guiding hand of top management is felt in each of the programs;
an indication of the importance of the training in the eyes
of the highest level executives. Keeping in mind the relatively
small sample size of the investigation, it appears that those
in industry who have felt the need for formal communication
training for executives have found it rewarding.
Many of the conditions that prevail in industry,
insofar as the need for formal communication training is
concerned, would also seem to prevail in the individual Navy
command, as was noted earlier. From a practical standpoint,
however, the incorporation of a similar formal communication
program for off3 <-.^rs in every command night present several
problems. Difficulties in providing instructcrs and in finding
time in an already crowded operations schedule might preclude
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any practical application of this training in most iea-»go1 ng
commar.ds. For the larger, shore-based command, such a program
may be feasible. It would seen appropriate that $ Navy-wide
syllabus for a program: be made available for those commands
that evidence a need. Teams of instructors assigned to the
various districts could orovide the instruction and suggestions
to the commanding officer for evaluation of effectiveness.
A similar program might be incorporated into an officers'
correspondence course for those who are not in a position to
take advantage of the oerson-to-oerson training. Some limita-
tion in this method are recognized, but it may be considered
as a secondary means. The characteristics of Industry's
programs would, provide an excellent framework for the orop-ram.
The best solution to the management communication problem lies
in the key word "awareness"
, according to Keyes. If local
command top management is aware of the problem, it is wall
alone: the road toward a solution. Wholehearted s import of
command would certainly be required for an effective training
prorram— an awareness of the need min-ht be expected to provide
that support.
Summary
Industry leaders generally &gr«4 that a communication
nrnhip-". »3cl»t« and raonts b^upvA t-hnt » f*nr»r-qi training n^Ogrn^
1
Keyes, Toe, cit., p. 109.
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for executives Is worthwhile.
A tremendous increase in company training programs
for executives has taken place in recent years. Most of the
programs are aimed at advancing basic skills, including the
ability to communicate.
All of the companies selected by one researcher as
having successfully solved the executive communication training
problem had similarly organized programs. All provided for
instruction in broad theory as well as specific requirements,
all monitored results closely, and all had the active support
of top management.
It is suggested that individual commands in the Navy
have similar requirements for formal training programs for
executives, in that junior officers may tend to specialize
In early years and develop a greater need for communication
as they advance. The nature of most sea-going commands,
however, may make similar formal programs lnfeasible, although




A management communication problem exists in the Navy
today at virtually all levels, due in large measure to the
tremendous increase in the flow of administrative communication
in the past few years. The corrective effort of all hands
has been directed. Regardless of what action may be contem-
plated at higher levels to alleviate the problem, a requirement
exists to make use of the most effective methods at the local
command level.
An examination of selected current writings on the
subject of management communication, along with a study of
industry communication training practices, indicates that many
of the basic concepts that are applicable to the business world
can also be applied to individual Naval units. As a result of
this examination and study, it Is concluded that certain
principles and practices are appropriate and worthy of consi-
deration at that level and, if incorporated, would result in
the improvement of management communication. The conclusions:
1. That provisions be made for those persons who
must deal with great quantities of written material in the
course of their duties to participate in reading improvement




certain selected enlisted men. Although this is not applicable
solely to the local command level, in that the paperwork
problem is not peculiar to that level, it is deemed of sufficient
importance to the overall improvement of management communication
to warrant its inclusion. Since the huge paperwork problem is
recognized as one of the major difficulties, providing those
who must deal with it directly with this ability seems a basic
step,
2, That the effects of informal communication be
studied in each individual command. It is not suggested that
informal communication can be completely controlled or predicted.
It is suggested that it can be influenced and can enhance
management communication if an effort is made to understand the
personal relationships that provide its impetus. A knowledge
of the limitations of informal communication is deemed parti-
cularly useful. The concepts of informal communication are
more significant at the local command level than at any other
because of the close relationships that exist at that level.
Where the opportunities are prevalent for personal inter-play
on a continuing day-to-day basis, informal organizations are
to be expected. This would be particularly true aboard a small
ship on an extended cruise, and is applicable to a lesser
extent on larger, shore-based activities.
3. That particular care be taken to ensure that
the broad missions of the command and of the Navy are made
known to each individual. This is considered an essential
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adjunct to Barnard's acceptance theory and an indispensable
part of downward communication. At higher levels in the Naval
organization, the overall mission is inore likely to be known
and appreciated. At the bottom rung of the ladder, the details
of how the Job is to te done are more likely to be-cloud the
"big picture". Each individual should know how the success or
failure of the immediate job at hand will affect the mission
of the whole organization.
4. That the number of formal written reports for use
entirely within the command be reduced, wherever possible,
and informal verbal reporting be substituted therefor. A
reduction in paperwork results and the flow of upward communica-
tion is encouraged. Since top management and intermediate
staffs must emphasize communication external to the organiza-
tion, this is much less applicable to them. Encouraging verbal
reporting for internal uses, with its attendant advantages, is
particularly appropriate for individual commands.
5. That a plan be effected to ensure the orderly
flow of upward communication which will provide the necessary
feedback for management. The informal communication chain may
not normally be expected to provide the necessary information.
The reporting system required of individual commands by senior
commands tends tc provide the required information at other
levels. For the local commander, the flow of upward communica-
tion within the organization may often be taken for granted or
the biased opinion of a few be considered as indicative of the
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feeling of the whole. A plan is required to ensure that all
factions are represented, that the mechanics of how the informa-
tion is conveyed are known to subordinates, that information is
not distorted enroute, and that intermediate levels do not
block the flow. Use of facilities independent ©f the chain of
command and the encouragement of confidence in superiors' aims
are recommended.
6. That the use of conferences and committees for
execution, decision making, and organization be decreased and
their use for problems involving the Interests of different
departments be increased. Recognition of the proper use of
committees provides the individual command with an effective
means of cutting across lines of authority. This concept is
deemed equally applicable to other levels.
7. That the concept of "automatic horizontal
communication" be incorporated to require communication between
departments, reduce the paperwork flow vertically, and encourage
ingenuity and resourcefulness of junior officers. The command-
ing officer will need to be a wholehearted supporter of the
concept and must allow his department heads some discretion
in the discharge of their responsibilities. The principles
of automatic horizontal communication make it particularly
adaptable to organizations where individuals on the same
horizontal level have ready access to each other and a close
relationship with subordinates. Its use at the local command




8. That training prop-rams be Incorporated as a means
of improving management communication capability for Naval
officers in certain local commands. Experience of several
firms in U. S. industry indicates that a formal program is
worthwhile for executives who are advancing and finding new
requirements for management communication abilities. A similar
situation would seem to exist for '/aval officers 8s they are
promoted to higher positions and broader responsibilities.
Although a similar need may exist at higher levels, it is at
the local command level where most Junior officers first meet
with the requirement for additional training in this field.
The nature of some operational commands may preclude the
practical application of formal training in certain instances.
Where feasible, however, programs similar to those in use by
industry could promote more efficient management communication.
9. That an awareness of the nee6 for effective manage-
ment communication be emphasized at the local command level.
The need for management communication is not necessarily any
greater for the local commander than for any other, but may
receive less attention at this level, due to the relatively
close knit nature of most individual organizations and the
personal relationships that exist. The positive attitude and
active participation of the commanding officer is a basic
requirement of an effective improvement program.
Management and supervision cannot occur without
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communication. As a means of attaining managerial objectives,
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